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Abstract—With the increasing number of mobile applications 
and the popularity of cloud computing, the combination of these 
two techniques that named mobile cloud computing (MCC) 
attracts great attention in recent years. A promising public key 
encryption scheme, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), 
especially the Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
(CP-ABE), has been used for realizing fine-grained access 
control on encrypted data stored in MCC. However, the 
computational overhead of encryption and decryption grow with 
the complexity of the access policy. Thus, maintaining data 
security as well as efficiency of data processing in MCC are 
important and challenging issues. In this paper, we propose an 
efficient encryption method based on CP-ABE, which can lower 
the overhead on data owners. To further reduce the decryption 
overhead on data receivers, we additionally propose a verifiable 
outsourced decryption scheme. By security analysis and 
performance evaluation, the proposed scheme is proved to be 
secure as well as efficient. 
Keywords— CP-ABE; outsourced decryption; verifiable; MCC 
I. INTRODUCTION  
MCC is a service that allows resource constrained mobile 
users to adaptively adjust processing and storage capabilities 
by transparently partitioning and offloading the 
computationally intensive and storage demanding jobs on 
traditional cloud re-sources by providing ubiquitous wireless 
access [1]. Some of the researches on mobile cloud computing 
can refer to [2][3]. In order to ensure the confidential of data as 
well as the access control, lots of studies focus on combining 
mobile cloud computing and ABE (or its variants).  
However, one of the drawbacks of ABE is that the 
computational overhead of encryption and decryption grows 
with the complexity of the access policy. To reduce the 
decryption computational overhead on DRs, some researchers 
consider that decrypt the ciphertexts by outsourced decryption 
cloud servers. What’s more, these semi-trusted servers learn 
nothing about the messages and DRs can verify the correctness 
of the transformed ciphertexts. But the encryption overhead is 
not taken into account. To solve the problem, we propose an 
efficient encryption scheme based on CP-ABE, which can 
dramatically enhance data encryption efficiency without loss 
of data security and data privacy. Main contributions of this 
paper can be summarized as follows: 1) We propose an 
efficient encryption method, especially when users require to 
repeatedly encrypt the messages under the same access 
structure. 2) We additionally apply verifiable outsourced 
decryption to our scheme. 3) We show the security analysis 
and provide a detailed performance evaluation to demonstrate 
the advantages of our scheme.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the related work. In section 3, some preliminaries 
are given. In section 4, our scheme is stated. In section 5, 
security analysis is given. In Section 6, the performance of our 
scheme is evaluated. In Section 7, the paper is concluded. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In [4], Sahai and Waters introduced attribute-based 
encryption (ABE) to achieve fine-grained encrypted access 
control. There must be at least n attributes overlapping 
between the ciphertext and user, the user could decrypt. In 
Goyal’s construction [5], they extended the expressiveness of 
access structure by associating a ciphertext with a set of 
attributes, named Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption 
(KP-ABE). In [6], Bethencourt et al introduced Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE), and used the 
attributes to describe a user’s credentials. The data owners 
specified the access policy. The decryption keys consisted of 
a set of attributes without any tree structure. 
In order to get a wider application, there are lots of 
researches on the combination of cloud and ABE. Wang et al 
[7] proposed a scheme to enable the confidential date to be 
stored on semi-trusted cloud servers. They realized the 
function by combining a HIBE system and a CP-ABE system. 
However, Yu et al [8] achieved fine-grainedness, scalability, 
and data confidentiality by exploiting and uniquely combining 
techniques of attribute-based encryption (ABE), proxy re-
encryption, and lazy re-encryption. Some other applications 
of access control can be referenced in [9-12]. 
To reduce the computation overhead on users, some 
researchers tried to outsource the decryption to cloud. Green 
et al [13] proposed a scheme that allow users to outsource 
their ciphertexts to cloud, and the cloud servers could 
translate them into a (constant-size) El Gamal-style ciphertext, 
without disclosing any information about the user’s messages. 
However, it couldn’t verify the correctness of outsourced 
decryption. In [14], Lai et al guaranteed that a user can 
efficiently check if the transformation is done correctly 
without relying on any random oracles. Compared with this 
scheme, Lin et al [15] proposed a more efficient construction 
ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption, which reduced 
the bandwidth and the computation costs almost by half. 
Some other similar works can be seen in [16-18].  
The similarity between the existing works and ours is that 
we are all based on ABE method, especially on outsourced 
decryption. However, in order to enhance the data processing 
efficiency, we propose a novel scheme that allow users not 
only to reduce the decryption computation overhead, but also 
the encryption computation overhead.  
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Bilinear Maps 
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime 
order p and g be the generator of G0. The bilinear map e 
is, 0 0 1:e G G G  , for all , pa b :  
 Bilinearity： 1, , ( , ) ( , )a b abu v G e u v e u v    
 Non-degeneracy: ( , ) 1e g g   
 Symmetric: ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b ab b ae g g e g g e g g   
B. Complexity Assumptions 
Definition 1 Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: 
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and 
g be its generator. Given a tuple , xg g  , where Rg G and 
Px are chosen uniformly at random, as input, the DL 
problem is to recover x. 
The DL assumption holds in G is that no probabilistic 
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm  can solve the DL problem 
with negligible advantage. We define the advantage of as 
follows: 
Pr[ , ]xg g x    
The probability is over the generator g, randomly chosen x 
and the random bits consumed by . 
C. CP-ABE 
Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) was proposed by Shamir [17] 
and Blakley [19] to share a secret among n parties, only n or 
more than n parties can the secret be retrieved. This idea was 
already used to realize the tree-access structure. We use the 
definition adapted from [6]: 
Let T be an access tree, and the root node is denoted by 
. At the beginning of the encryption, we will conduct a 
polynomial for each node from top to bottom.  Let S  be the set of leaf nodes value, where 
(0) (0)ˆ ˆ: , , ' ( ( ))y yq qLeafNode y yS y S C g C H att y    . 
Finally, ,T S will be the components of ciphertext, 
denoting its corresponding access structure. To retrieve the secret, we define the Lagrange 
coefficient ,i S as follows: 
      For Pi , and for x S  ,  
     
, ( ) ,i S x j S j i
x j
i j 
    
We now give the definition of security model for CP-ABE. 
In this security game, adversary is allowed to challenge on an 
encryption to an access structure AS* and query for any 
private key SK such that SK does not satisfy AS*. The game 
proceeds as follows: 
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the 
public parameters PK to the adversary and keeps MK to 
itself. 
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private keys 
corresponding to sets of attributes         . (q and q1 is an 
integer that randomly chosen by and 11 q q   ). If any of 
the sets           satisfies the access structure AS*, then aborts. 
Else, generates the corresponding secret keys to the sets for 
. Then he submits a set of attribute and a ciphertext CT and 
obtains the corresponding M from . 
Challenge: submits two equal length messages M0 and 
M1 to . The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, and 
encrypts Mb under the challenge access structure AS*. Then 
the generated ciphertext CT* will be given to . 
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1, and the sets are turned 
from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S . 
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b 
and wins the game if 'b b . 
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined 
as 
1( ) Pr[ ' ] 2Adv b b   , 
where the probability is taken over the random bits used 
by the challenger and the adversary. 
Definition 2 A CP-ABE scheme is CCA-secure if all 
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible 
advantage in the above game. 
Definition 3 We say that a CP-ABE scheme is CPA-secure 
if the adversaries cannot make decryption queries in Phase 1. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF OUR SYSTEM 
A. Setup 
The TA will run this setup algorithm and generate a set of 
public parameters. First, it chooses a bilinear group 0G  of 
prime order p with generator g and several random exponents: 
, , pq   . We introduce hash functions (), ()m aH H  for 
plaintext and all of the attributes. The public key and the 
master key are published as: 
   
0 , , , ( , ) ,
, ,
qPK G g h g e g g g
MK g q
 

 
  
B. Key Generation 
Key_Gen(PK, MK, S) →SK 
The set of attributes S will be the input and a corresponding 
key is the output. This algorithm first chooses Pr and 
j Pr  at random for each attribute j S . Then it computes 
the key as: 
 , , ( ) , '
r
r rj rj
j jSK D g j S D g H j D g


         
 
C. Encryption 
In the traditional scheme [6], we will conduct an access 
tree for one access structure in each encryption process. For 
11
,... qS S
11
,... qS S
one access structure ASi, its information will be contained in 
,i iT S where, 
 , ,(0) (0), ,ˆ ˆ: , , ' ( ( ))i y i yq qi LeafNode i y i y aS y S C g C H att y     
The Data Owner (DO) can record the access structure ASi 
and consider it as an Encryption Machine. We define its 
Encryption Machine EMi as follows: 
 :{ , , }i i i iEM T S s  
Once DO requires to encrypt another new message M with 
the ASi , he will run this encryption algorithm. 
EM_Encrypt(M , PK, MK, EMi )→CT  
At first, this algorithm selects , ,P P Pu t s      at 
random. Then it will update and re-randomize the components 
in EMi. 
Set ,, (0) (0)i y i ys s s q q s     : 
 ( )( || ) ( , ) ( || ) ( , )is s t stC M u e g g M u e g g    
 ( )1 is s t stC h h   
 ( )0 mH M qC u  
 
( (0) ) (0)
( (0) ) (0)
ˆ' : , ,
ˆ       ' ( ( )) ( ( ))
y y
y y
q s t q t
i LeafNode y
q s t q t
y a a
S y S C g g
C H att y H att y


   
 

 
Finally, the ciphertext is published as: 
  0 1, , , , 'i iCT T C C C S    
D. Decryption 
The Date Receiver (DR) will run this algorithm to decrypt 
his ciphertext. 
Decrypt(CT , SK, PK)→M or⊥ 
The decryption algorithm takes as input the PK, SK 
and  0 1, , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   . If the node z is a leaf node, let 
j=att(z), if j S , then, 

(0)
(0)
(0)
ˆ( , )
ˆ( ', ')
( ( ) , )
            
( , ( ( )) )
    ( , )
y
z
z
j y
z
j y
q tr rj
a
q trj
a
rtq
e D C
F
e D C
e g H j g
e g H att z
e g g



 
Let x be the parent node of these nodes z, let xS be the set 
of its child nodes, the outputs will be stored in xS  
If ,x zz S F   , the function returns ⊥. Else, it can get the 
root node value by running recursive function:  

 ''( 0 )
' ( 0 ),
' ( 0 ),( )
' ( 0 ),
,
(0 )
( ( ))
( )
(0 )
( )
{ ( ) : }
,   
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( , )
x x
i x
x
n Sxz
x
i Sparent z x
x
i Sx x
x
x
S
x z
z S
rtq
z S
rtq index z
z S
rtq n
z S
rtq
n index z
index z z S
F F where S
e g g
e g g
e g g
e g g









  



 
If DR’s attribute set satisfies ,iT it will get:  
 = ( , )rtsRF e g g  
To recover M, it will perform the encryption as follows: 
 1
( || ) ( , ) e( , )
( , )
( , )
             ||
st rst
R
r
st
CF M u e g g g g
e C D
e h g
M u






 
E. Verification 
Verify_M(CT, ', 'M u , PK)→True or False 
First, DR will utilize the Hash function and u to calculate 
this M: 
 ( ')', ' ' mH MM u u   
Verify that: 
 ( ')0( , ) ( ' , )vH M qe C g e u g   
If (15) exits, this algorithm will output True. Else, it will output False. 
F. Outsource 
To reduce the decryption overhead, we introduce the 
outsourced decryption into our scheme. This process requires 
several algorithms to complete. We will describe the details as 
follows: 
Gen_TK(PK, SK)→TK, RK   
This algorithm takes as input the PK and the user’s SK, 
where 
, , ( ) , '
r
r rj rj
j jSK D g j S D g H j D g


         
. 
It chooses ,P Pw v   uniformly at random. Then this 
algorithm re-randomize the SK components with these two 
parameters.  
The TK is set as: 

' ,
, ' ( ) ( ) ,
           ''       
r r v
v
r rj w r w rj
j
rj
j
D g g g
TK j S D g H j g g H j
D g
 
 
  

            
 
The RK is set as: 
 ˆ,
w
v
R RRK D g D g
      
 
Out_Decrypt(CT , TK, PK)→T or⊥ 
This algorithm takes as input the PK, the TK and a 
ciphertext, where 
 0 1, , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   . 
If the user’s attribute set doesn’t satisfy the access 
structure, it outputs ⊥. Else, it computes as follows: 
If the node z is a leaf node, let j=att(z), if j S , then, 

(0)
(0)
( ) (0)
ˆ( ', ) ( ( ) , )
       ˆ ( , ( ( )) )( '', ')
    ( , )
y
z
z
q tr w rj
j y a
z q trj
aj y
r w tq
e D C e g H j g
F
e g H att ze D C
e g g


 

 
To obtain the root node value by running the following 
recursive function:  
 ''( 0 )
' ( 0 ),
' ( 0 ),( )
' ( 0 ),
,
(0)
( ( ))
( )
(0)
( )
{ ( ) : }
,   
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( , )
x x
i x
x
n Sxz
x
i Sparent z x
x
i Sx x
x
x
S
x z
z S
rtq
z S
rtq index z
z S
rtq n
z S
rtq
n index z
index z z S
F F where S
e g g
e g g
e g g
e g g









  



 
Finally, it will get:  
 ( )= ( , ) r w tsRF e g g   
Then, it will perform the encryption as follows: 

( )
1
( )
( )
( )
( || ) ( , ) e( , )
( , ')
( , )
( || ) ( , )             
( , ) ( , )
( || ) ( , )              =
( , ) ( , )
st r w st
R
r v
st
r w st
r v
st st v
r w st
r st st v vst
CF M u e g g g gT
e C D
e h g
M u e g g
e h g e h g
M u e g g
e g g e h g







 

 
 
 
 

 


 
This algorithm outputs T. 
DR_Decrypt(CT , T,  RK, PK)→M or⊥ 
This algorithm takes as input a  0 1, , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   , T, 
RK, and PK. To recover M, it computes: 

( )
1
( )
1
( )
( )
( , ) ( || ) ( , ) ( , )
ˆ ( , ) ( , )( , )
( , )
( || ) ( , ) ( , )                 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
                 ||
r w st st v
R
r st st v vst w
R st
r w st vst
r st st v vst wst
e C D M u e g g e h gT
e g g e h ge C D
e h g
M u e g g e g g
e g g e h g e g g
M u

 

 
 
 

 




 
To verify the correctness of this message, DR can call the 
verification algorithm.  
Verify_M(CT, ', 'M u , PK)→True or False 
We set ', 'M u to denote the message and the random 
number by outsource decryption. Then the algorithm 
computes: 
 ( ')', ' ' mH MM u u    
Verify that: 
 ( ')0( , ) ( ' , )vH M qe C g e u g    
If (24) exits, this algorithm will output True. Else, it will output False.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. System Security 
Theorem 1: The security of our system is no weaker than 
that of [6]. 
Proof: We prove this theorem by the following game. 
Suppose that an adversary  can attack our scheme with non-
negligible advantage. 
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the 
public parameters                                              to the 
adversary and keeps                                to itself. 
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private keys 
corresponding to sets of attributes
11
,... qS S .  
In addition, he also submits an access structure AS*. If any 
of the sets satisfies the access structure AS*, then aborts. 
generates the corresponding secret keys SKs to the sets for 
.
Challenge: submits two equal length messages M0 and 
M1 to . The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, and 
encrypts Mb under the challenge access structure AS*. Then 
the generated ciphertext                                     will be given 
to .
Phase 2: issues queries for repeated private keys as in 
Phase 1, and the sets are turned from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S . 
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b 
and wins the game if 'b b . 
Obviously, the game has properly simulated in that of [6]. 
Thus, if  can attack our scheme with non-negligible 
advantage, he can attack the CP-ABE [6] as well. 
B. Encryption 
Theorem 2: The construction of ciphertext in our scheme 
is secure. 
Proof: We prove this theorem by the following game. 
Suppose that an adversary  can attack the construction of 
ciphertexts in our scheme with non-negligible advantage. The 
game proceeds as follows: 
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the 
public parameters                                              to the 
adversary and keeps                                to itself. 
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private keys 
corresponding to sets of attributes
11
,... qS S . 
 generates the corresponding secret keys SKs to the sets 
for . 
Challenge: submits an access structure AS* to  (any 
of the sets doesn’t satisfy this structure). The challenger  
randomly chooses a message and 1 2,P Pu u   , encrypts 
them under AS*. Then he will sent the two different generated 
ciphertext 1 2*, *CT CT (suppose that 2 1s s s    ), where   
 1 1 1,0 1,1 ,1* , , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   , 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1( || ) ( , ) ( || ) ( , )
s t s tC M u e g g M u e g g   
1 1
1,1
s tC h 
 0 , , , ( , ) , qPK G g h g e g g g   , , ,MK g q k
 0 1* , , , , 'i iCT T C C C S  
 0 , , , ( , ) , qPK G g h g e g g g   , , ,MK g q k
( )
1,0 1
mH M qC u 
1, 1 1, 1(0) (0)
,1 1, 1,
ˆ ˆ' : , , ' ( ( ))y yq t q ti LeafNode y y aS y S C g C H att y    , 
and  2 0 1* , , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   , 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2( || ) ( , ) ( || ) ( , )
s t s tC M u e g g M u e g g   
2 2
2,1
s tC h 
( )
2,0 2
mH M qC u 
2, 2 2, 2(0) (0)
,2 2, 2,
ˆ ˆ' : , , ' ( ( ))y yq t q ti LeafNode y y aS y S C g C H att y    . 
Phase 2: issues queries for repeated private keys as in 
Phase 1, and the sets are turned from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S . 
Output: The adversary outputs the Encryption 
Machine *:{ , , }i i iEM T S s . 
If adversary  wins the game, the challenger obtains the 
EMi*, where 1 2 1 2 1 2, ,u u t t s s   . However,  
2, 2
2, 2 1, 1
1, 1
1
2, 2
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To recover 1 2 2, 2 1, 1(0) (0)y yx x q t q t   , he has to solve the 
DL problem. Since it is computationally infeasible to solve 
the problem in G. Thus,  cannot attack the construction of 
ciphertext in our scheme with non-negligible advantage. 
C. Verifiability 
Theorem 3: The proposed construction of CP-ABE is 
verifiable. 
Proof:  The verifiability is described as a game between a 
challenger  and an adversary . In this security game, 
suppose that the adversary can attack the verifiability of our 
scheme with non-negligible advantage. The game proceeds as 
follows: 
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the 
public parameters PK to the adversary and keeps MK to 
itself. 
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private keys 
corresponding to sets of attributes         . If any of the sets         
satisfies the access structure AS*, then aborts. Else, 
generates the corresponding secret keys to the sets for . 
He submits a set of attribute and a ciphertext CT and obtains 
the corresponding M from . 
Challenge: submits a message M* and an access 
structure AS*. The challenger  encrypts M* under the 
challenge access structure AS*. Then the generated ciphertext 
CT* will be given to .Let  0 1* , , , , 'i iCT T C C C S   , 
where ( *)0 ˆ m
H M qC u , q is MK and uˆ is chosen by randomly.
Phase 2: issues queries for repeated private keys as in 
Phase 1. 
Output: The adversary  outputs M and u.  
If he wins the game, the challenger 
obtains ( )0 ' mH M qC u , where *M M  and ˆu u . Since Hm 
is a collision-resistant hash function, with negligible 
probability, *( ) ( )m mH M H M . 
D. Outsource 
Theorem 4: The security of our system with outsourced 
decryption is no weaker than that of [6]. 
Proof: We prove this theorem by the following game. 
Suppose that an adversary  can attack our scheme with 
outsourced decryption with non-negligible advantage. 
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the 
public parameters                                              to the 
adversary and keeps                                to itself. 
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private SK and TK 
keys corresponding to sets of attributes
11
,... qS S . 
generates the corresponding secret keys SKs and TKs for 
. The RKs are unknown to .
Challenge: submits two equal length messages M0 and 
M1 and an access structure AS* to . The challenger  
randomly flips a coin b, and encrypts Mb under the challenge 
access structure AS* (the sets above cannot satisfy this access 
structure). Then the generated ciphertext CT* will be given to 
.
Phase 2: issues queries for repeated private keys as in 
Phase 1, and the sets are turned from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S . 
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b 
and wins the game if 'b b . 
Obviously, the game has properly simulated in that of [6]. 
Thus, if  can attack the construction of outsourced 
decryption in our scheme with non-negligible advantage, he 
can attack the CP-ABE [6] as well. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To evaluate the performance of our system, we 
implemented a testing environment with the help of the 
cpabe-toolkit [20]. 
We encrypt the message under an access tree that 
contained ten levels and a hundred leaf nodes. As shown in 
Fig.1 (a), the average encryption time is greatly reduced. 
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Fig. 1(a). Comparison of the average encryption time between the tradition 
scheme in [6] and ours, when the size of message grows. 
Additionally, we select the 1GB message and encrypt it 
under the above tree for different times. As shown in Fig.1 (b), 
along with the number of encryption times grows, the average 
encryption time of CP-ABE is approximately flat, while the 
time in our scheme is slowly decreasing. 
 
Fig. 1(b). Comparison of the average encryption time between the tradition 
scheme in [6] and ours, when the number of encryption times grows. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm, ABE is widely 
used for realizing access control in cloud. Generally, users 
encrypt their data in local and store them into cloud. However, 
maintaining data security and system efficiency meanwhile is 
a challenging issue. Existing related schemes seldom take 
efficiency of data encryption into consideration. To solve this 
problem, this paper proposes an efficient encryption scheme 
based on CP-ABE, which can not only guarantee secure data 
access, but also reduce overhead both on DO and DR. The 
security analysis shows that the proposed scheme can meet 
the security requirement. The evaluations show the 
advantages on the efficiency of data encryption.  
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